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Abstract—We study the secure and reliable connectivity of
wireless sensor networks under the heterogeneous pairwise key
predistribution scheme. This scheme was recently introduced as
an extension of the random pairwise key predistribution scheme
of Chan et al. to accommodate networks where the constituent
sensors have different capabilities or requirements for security
and connectivity. For simplicity, we consider a heterogeneous
network where each of the n sensors is classified as type-1
(respectively, type-2) with probability µ (respectively, 1−µ) where
0 < µ < 1. Each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node selects 1
(respectively, Kn) other nodes uniformly at random to be paired
with; according to the pairwise scheme each pair is then assigned
a unique pairwise key so that they can securely communicate with
each other. We establish critical conditions on n, µ, and Kn such
that the resulting network has minimum node degree of at least k
with high probability in the limit of large network size. Our result
constitutes a zero-one law for the minimum node degree of the
recently introduced inhomogeneous random K-out graph model.
This constitutes a crucial step towards establishing a similar zero-
one law for the k-connectivity of the graph; i.e., for the property
that the network remains connected despite the failure of any
k− 1 nodes or links. We present numerical results that indicate
the usefulness of our results in selecting the parameters of the
scheme in practical settings with finite number of sensors.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Random Graphs,
Connectivity, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are of vital importance
in numerous application domains including environmental
sensing, health monitoring, surveillance and tracking [1]. The
affordability, scalability, low-power consumption and ease of
installation has made WSNs the backbone of several emerg-
ing technologies [2]. WSNs are often deployed in hostile
environments making them susceptible to adversarial attacks
and operational failures. The limited energy, computation,
and communication capabilities of WSNs precludes the use
of standard cryptosystems to safeguard these networks [3].
Eschenauer and Gligor addressed this issue of security in
WSNs by introducing the notion of random key predistribution
in their pioneering work [4]. Following this work, several
variants of random key predistribution emerged; e.g., see [5],
[6] and the references therein.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation
through grant CCF #1617934.
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Fig. 1: A WSN comprising 5 nodes secured by the heterogeneous
random pairwise key predistribution scheme. Each type-1 (resp. type-
2) node randomly picks 1 (resp. K = 2) nodes and a unique pairwise
key is given to node pairs per selection; in this example, node A is
type-2 and others are type-1. Two nodes can communicate if they have
at least one pairwise key in common. This induces a graph with edges
corresponding to node pairs which share at least one key in common.
One of the widely acclaimed schemes is the random pair-
wise key predistribution scheme proposed by Chan et al. in [7].
The random pairwise key predistribution scheme comprises of
two phases. First, each sensor node is paired offline with K
nodes chosen uniformly at random among all sensor nodes.
Next, a unique pairwise key is distributed to all node pairs in
which at least one of the nodes is paired to the other during the
offline node-pairing step. After deployment, two sensor nodes
can communicate securely if they have at least one pairwise
key in common. In Section II, we give the precise imple-
mentation details of this scheme and its heterogeneous variant
proposed in [8]. The pairwise key predistribution scheme
preserves the secrecy of rest of the network in case of node
capture attacks, and also enables node-to-node authentication
and quorum-based revocation [7].
The random pairwise key predistribution scheme induces a
class of random graphs known as random K-out graphs [9]–
[12]: each of the n vertices is assigned K arcs towards K
distinct vertices that are selected uniformly at random, and
then the orientation of the arcs is ignored. Let H(n;K) denote
the resulting random K-out graph. In [10], [11], it was shown
that if K ≥ 2, then the resulting graph is 1-connected with
high probability. More precisely, we have
lim
n→∞P [H(n;K) is connected] =
{
1 if K ≥ 2,
0 if K = 1.
Emerging real-world networks are characterized by hetero-
geneous nodes differing in their roles, resources, hardware lim-
itations and connectivity requirements [13]–[15]. This made
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it necessary to develop and analyze heterogeneous variants of
classical key predistribution schemes. From a theoretical stand
point, this corresponds to advancing the literature pertaining
to connectivity in inhomogeneous variants of classical random
graph models. In order to model differing node capabilities,
[8] introduced a heterogeneous pairwise key predistribution
scheme in which each node is classified as type-1 (respectively,
type-2) with probability µ (respectively, 1 − µ), 0 < µ < 1.
Then, each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node selects one node
(respectively, Kn nodes) uniformly at random from all other
nodes; see Figure 1. The heterogeneous pairwise key predis-
tribution scheme induces an inhomogeneous random K-out
graph, denoted H(n;µ,Kn). The analysis of 1-connectivity
in [8] of H(n;µ,Kn) yielded the rather surprising result that
lim
n→∞P [H(n;µ,Kn) is connected] =
{
1 if Kn = ω(1),
< 1 otherwise.
This paper is motivated by the fact that in many applications
it is desirable to have a stronger notion of connectivity; e.g.,
the network remaining connected despite edge or node failures
and removals. To this end, this work initiates a study on the
k-connectivity of WSNs under the heterogeneous pairwise
scheme. A network is said to be k-connected if it remains
connected despite the removal of any k − 1 of its nodes or
edges1. Moreover, in a k-connected graph, there are at least
k mutually disjoint paths between any pair of nodes. In the
context of WSNs, the property of k-connectivity is highly
desirable since it makes the network resilient to the failure of
up to k−1 sensor nodes or k−1 links. Such failures could arise
in practice due to operational failures, adversarial capture of
nodes, or battery depletion. In addition to providing reliability
against failures, k-connectivity facilitates the incorporation of
mobile nodes with intermittent connectivity. A k-connected
WSN can at any given time support up to k− 1 mobile nodes
without disrupting connectivity. This motivates us to study re-
liable connectivity, namely k-connectivity in networks secured
by the heterogeneous pairwise key distribution scheme.
We envision that the simplicity of graph construction and
unique connectivity properties position the K-out graph as a
promising model for many real-world networks in addition
to WSNs. Recently, a structure similar to the random K-
out graph was proposed in [17, Algorithm 1] for generating
anonymity graphs to facilitate diffusion of transaction infor-
mation, thereby making the crypto-currency network robust to
de-anonymization attacks. Given their sparse yet connected
structure, random K-out graphs can potentially be useful
also for payment channels used for scaling cryptocurrency
networks such as the Lightning Network [18]. We further
motivate our work by noting that in these additional potential
1The notion of k-connectivity used in this paper refers to k-vertex connec-
tivity, which is defined as the property that the graph remains connected after
deletion of any k−1 vertices. It is known [16] that a k-vertex connected graph
is always k-edge connected, meaning that it will remain connected despite
the removal of any k − 1 edges. Thus, we say that a graph is k-connected
(without explicitly referring to vertex-connectivity) to refer to the fact that it
will remain connected despite the deletion of any k − 1 vertices or edges.
applications as well, it would be of interest to study the
the k-connectivity property and to understand the impact of
heterogeneity. For example, having at least k mutually disjoint
paths between every pair of nodes would be useful in payment
channels since some links could fail due to depletion of funds.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we initiate the analysis of k-connectivity
in WSNs secured by the heterogeneous pairwise key predis-
tribution scheme which induces an inhomogeneous random
K-out graph H(n;µ,Kn). We establish a zero-one law for
the property that the minimum node degree is at least k. In
particular, we present conditions on µ and Kn such that the
resulting graph has minimum degree at least k with probability
approaching one (respectively, zero) constituting the one-law
(respectively, zero-law), as the number of nodes gets large.
Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the usefulness
of these results in selecting the parameters of the pairwise
scheme when the number of nodes is finite. An interesting
finding is that for inhomogeneous random K-out graphs, the
number of additional edges needed to go from 1-connectivity
to k-connectivity with k ≥ 2 is unexpectedly larger as
compared to many other random graph models studied before;
see Table I for details.
Our result provides a crucial step towards establishing a
zero-one law for k-connectivity in inhomogeneous random K-
out graphs. In particular, since minimum node degree being at
least k constitutes a necessary condition for k-connectivity,
the zero-law established here also provides a zero-law for
k-connectivity. In fact, taking evidence from several other
random graph models [16], [19], [20], we conjecture that the
one-law for k-connectivity will also be identical to the one-law
established here for minimum node degree being at least k.
This conjecture is supported further through numerical results.
C. Notation
All limits are understood with the number of nodes n going
to infinity. While comparing asymptotic behavior of a pair of
sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn), an = O(bn), an =
Θ(bn), and an = ω(bn) with their meaning in the standard
Landau notation. All random variables are defined on the same
probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements are made
with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the
corresponding expectation operator by E. We let 1{A} denote
the indicator random variable which takes the value 1 if event
A occurs and 0 otherwise. We say that an event holds with high
probability (whp) if it holds with probability one as n→∞.
We denote the cardinality of any discrete set A by |A| and the
set of all positive integers by N0.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Heterogeneous random pairwise key predistribution
The widely studied pairwise key predistribution scheme pro-
posed by Chan et al. [7] was extended in [8] to heterogeneous
settings to accommodate networks where sensors differ in their
capabilities and mission requirements. The steps undertaken
to establish secure connectivity in the heterogeneous random
pairwise key predistribution scheme are as follows. Consider
a network comprising of n nodes which are labeled as i =
1, 2, . . . n and assigned unique IDs: Id1, . . . , Idn. Each node
is labeled as type-1 (respectively, type-2) with probability µ
(respectively, 1 − µ) independently from other nodes where
0 < µ < 1. In the (offline) initialization phase, each type-
1 (respectively, type-2) node selects K1 (respectively, K2)
other nodes chosen uniformly at random. The homogeneous
pairwise scheme [7] corresponds to the case where µ = 0 and
all nodes choose exactly K nodes to be paired with.
Define N := {1, 2, . . . , n} and N−i := {1, 2, . . . , n} \ i.
For each i ∈ N , let Γn,i ⊆ N−i denote the subset of nodes
selected by node i from N−i uniformly at random. With ti ∈
{1, 2} denoting the type of node i, we have for any A ⊆ N−i
P[Γn,i = A | ti = `] =

(
n−1
K`
)−1
if |A| = K`,
0 otherwise.
We further assume that Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n are mutually indepen-
dent given the types of nodes.
Once the offline pairing process has been completed, we
insert key rings Σn,1, . . . ,Σn,n in the memory modules as
follows. If i ∈ Γn,j ∨ j ∈ Γn,i, i.e., either node i selects node
j or node j selects node i or both, we generate a pairwise
key ωij and store this key and the corresponding node IDs in
the memory modules of both nodes i and j. It is important to
note that the key ωij is assigned exclusively to nodes i and j
to be used in securing the communication between them. This
strategy of assigning unique keys to nodes which were paired
during the offline node-pairing process is the reason why this
approach is called the pairwise key predistribution scheme.
Having unique, pairwise keys brings several advantages in-
cluding distributed node-to-node authentication and resilience
to node capture attacks [7].
In the post-deployment key-setup phase, nodes first broad-
cast their IDs to their neighbors following which each node
searches for the corresponding IDs in their key rings. Fi-
nally, node pairs wishing to communicate verify each others’
identities through a cryptographic handshake [7]. Thus, by
construction, the pairwise key predistribution facilitates node-
to-node authentication.
In the rest of this paper, we assume K1 = 1 and K2 ≥ 2
as in [8] for simplicity. The more general cases with arbi-
trary number of node types and arbitrary scheme parameters
K1,K2, . . ., should be studied in a separate paper. We assume
that 0 < µ < 1 is fixed and K2 scales with n. From here
onward, let Kn denote the scaling of K2 with n. In [8], the
1-connectivity of the network under this setting was studied.
In particular, it was shown that the network is connected whp
only if Kn grows unboundedly large as n→∞ (irrespective
of µ). This was in stark contrast with the results for the
homogeneous case where it is known that the network is
connected whp if K ≥ 2 (with K being the number of choices
made by every node). The main goal of this paper is to initiate
a study on the k-connectivity of the network under the same
setting; e.g., by revealing conditions on Kn and µ required
for the network to be k-connected whp.
B. Inhomogeneous Random K-out graph
A WSN comprising of n sensors secured by the heteroge-
neous pairwise key predistribution scheme can be modeled by
an inhomogeneous random K-out graph defined as follows.
Two distinct nodes i and j are said to be adjacent, written
i ∼ j, if and only if they have at least one common key in
their respective key rings as defined above. Equivalently, nodes
i and j are adjacent if either node picks the other or both; i.e.,
i ∼ j if j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn,j . (1)
Thus, given a set of n nodes, the adjacency condition (1) gives
a precise edge construction on the vertex set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We denote the graph constructed using (1) as H(n;µ,Kn).
Further, let 〈Kn〉 denote the average number of selections per
node given by µ + (1 − µ)Kn. We note that if µ = 0, the
inhomogeneous random K-out graph becomes equivalent to
the homogeneous random K-out graph [10]–[12].
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present our main technical result: a zero-
one law for the minimum node degree of the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph being at least k. We then provide a
discussion on the implications of our main result, and we
explain why it is expected to pave the way to establish a
similar zero-one law for k-connectivity. Finally, we provide
experimental results that demonstrate the usefulness of our
result in the finite node regime and support our conjecture
that an analog of Theorem 1 holds for k-connectivity.
A. Main results
We refer to any mapping K : N0 → N0 as a scaling if it
satisfies the condition
2 ≤ Kn < n, n = 2, 3, . . . .
Our main result is presented next.
Theorem 1: Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 and µ such
that 0 < µ < 1. With 〈Kn〉 = µ + (1 − µ)Kn and a positive
integer k ≥ 2 let the sequence γ : N0 → R be defined through
〈Kn〉 = log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn, (2)
for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Then, we have
lim
n→∞P
[
Min. node degree of
H(n;µ,Kn) is ≥ k
]
=

1 if lim
n→∞γn = +∞,
0 if lim
n→∞γn = −∞.
Theorem 1 establishes scaling conditions on 〈Kn〉 (i.e.,
on Kn and µ) such that the minimum node degree of the
inhomogeneous random K-out graph H(n;µ,Kn) is at least
k, and less than k, respectively, with high probability as
the number of nodes approaches infinity. Put differently, it
establishes a zero-one law for the property that H(n;µ,Kn)
has minimum degree of at least k. An immediate consequence
of Theorem 1 is that 〈Kn〉 must scale as Ω(log n) for the
minimum node degree to be at least k. The scaling condition
(2) in Theorem 1 can be equivalently expressed in terms of
the network parameters µ and Kn as follows
Kn =
log n+ (k − 2) log log n
1− µ + γn. (3)
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on applying the method of
first and second moments [21] to a random variable counting
the number of nodes with degree less than k. The dichotomous
results with γn approaching +∞ and −∞ can be intuitively
viewed as a consequence of the expected number of nodes
with degree less than k approaching ∞ (respectively, 0) as γn
goes to ∞ (respectively, −∞). However, the complex inter-
dependencies in the node degrees make this analysis quite
challenging. In particular, the second moment analysis requires
careful consideration of several cases for the node degree
of a pair of nodes and the selections made by them. Due
to space constraints, we provide a brief sketch of the proof
for Theorem 1 in Section IV; all details can be found in the
Appendix.
B. Discussion
Recall that a k-connected graph remains connected upon
deletion of any k − 1 nodes or edges. Consequently, for a
graph to be k-connected, the minimum node degree for the
graph must be at least k. Thus, Theorem 1 also provides a
necessary condition for k-connectivity in networks secured
by the heterogeneous pairwise key predistribution scheme. In
particular, under scaling (2), Theorem 1 automatically gives
the corresponding zero-law for k-connectivity. Furthermore,
in most random graph models including Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs
[16], random key graphs [19] and random geometric graphs
[20], the conditions required to ensure a minimum node degree
of at least k are shown to be sufficient to make the graph
k-connected whp. This is done by showing that it is highly
unlikely for the corresponding graph to be not k-connected
if all nodes have at least k neighbors. In light of this (as
well as our numerical studies presented in Section III-C), we
conjecture the following zero-one law for k-connectivity.
Conjecture 2: 2 Consider a scalingK : N0 → N0 and µ such
that 0 < µ < 1. With a positive integer k ≥ 2 let the sequence
γ : N0 → R be defined through (2). Then, we have
lim
n→∞P
[
H(n;µ,Kn) is
k-connected
]
=

1 if lim
n→∞γn = +∞,
0 if lim
n→∞γn = −∞.
We now discuss the implications of Theorem 1 on connec-
tivity for heterogeneous pairwise predistribution scheme and
compare the results with other key predistribution schemes.
Table I summarizes the mean node degree requirements for
having 1-connectivity and k-connectivity for homogeneous
2This conjecture has been proved: M. Sood, O. Yag˘an, “Zero-one law for
k-connectivity in Inhomogeneous Random K-out Graphs”, 2019.
and inhomogeneous versions of random K-out graphs [8],
[10] and random key graphs induced by the EG scheme [4],
[22]–[24]. For the inhomogeneous versions, the table entries
correspond to the mean degree of the least connected node
type. We also added the corresponding results for Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs [16] for comparison. An interesting observation
is that for the inhomogeneous random K-out graph, going
from 1-connectivity to k-connectivity requires an increase of
log n + (k − 2) log log n in the mean degree. This is much
larger than what is required (i.e., (k − 1) log log n) in the
other models seen in Table I. In addition, we see that the
homogeneous pairwise key predistribution scheme incurs the
least overhead in terms of the edges and keys required to
achieve 1-connectivity or k-connectivity. For instance, if all
nodes select two neighbors, the resulting network is securely
2-connected. However, the analysis of 1-connectivity in [8]
and Theorem 1 together suggest that the perceived benefits of
the pairwise scheme reduce in the face of heterogeneity when
K1 = 1, i.e., when a positive fraction of nodes picks just one
other node to be paired with.
Random
graph 1-connectivity k-connectivity, k ≥ 2
Homogeneous
K-out 4 2k
Inhomogeneous
K-out ω(1) logn+(k− 2) log logn+ω(1)
Homogeneous
random key logn+ ω(1) logn+(k− 1) log logn+ω(1)
Inhomogeneous
random key logn+ ω(1) logn+(k− 1) log logn+ω(1)
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi logn+ ω(1) logn+(k− 1) log logn+ω(1)
TABLE I: Comparing the mean node degree necessary for 1-
connectivity and k-connectivity in several random graph models. For
inhomogeneous K-out and inhomogeneous random key graphs, the
values given in the table correspond to the mean degree for the least
connected node type.
C. Simulation results
This section presents empirical studies which probe the
applicability of Theorem 1 in the non-asymptotic regime
with finite number of sensors. For each experiment, we fix
the number of nodes at n = 500 and generate 1000 in-
dependent realizations of the inhomogeneous random K-out
graph H(n;µ,Kn). To obtain the empirical probability of
minimum node degree being at least k, we divide the number
of instances for which the generated graph has minimum node
degree of at least k by the total number 1000 of instances
generated. Likewise, we compute the empirical probability for
k-connectivity by counting the number of times (out of 1000)
for which the resulting graph is k-connected.
Through simulations, we study the impact of the probability
of assignment to type-1 (µ) and the number of selections made
by type-2 nodes (Kn) on the probability that minimum node
degree is at least k, for various k values. A smaller value
of µ corresponds to a network dominated by type-2 nodes
and thus the resulting random graph H(n;µ,Kn) has a larger
probability of having a minimum node degree of at least k.
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Fig. 2: Empirical probability (computed by averaging 1000 indepen-
dent experiments for each data point) for the minimum node degree
being no less than k as a function ofKn for n = 500 and µ = 0.1, 0.9.
Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon by comparing the cases
with µ = 0.1 and µ = 0.9. Moreover, for k1 ≥ k2 ≥ 2, the
event that a graph has a minimum node degree of at least k1 is
a subset of the event that a graph has a minimum node degree
greater than or equal to k2. Thus, we see an upwards shift in
the curves when going from k = 4 to k = 2.
In each figure, we also plot a vertical-dashed line corre-
sponding to the critical threshold of having minimum node
degree at least k asserted by Theorem 1 through scaling
condition (3). Namely, vertical dashed lines represent the Kn
value satisfying
Kn =
⌈
log n+ (k − 2) log log n
1− µ
⌉
. (4)
The desired probability of minimum node degree being no less
than k is 0 for small values of Kn and increases sharply to
1 in a neighborhood of the threshold described by (4). Thus,
we find a good agreement between our numerical results and
Theorem 1 even when the number of nodes is finite.
Finally, we test the validity of Conjecture 2 for k-
connectivity. Figure 3 presents the empirical probability of
k-connectivity and minimum node degree being no less than
k as k varies from 2 to 4 and µ = 0.5. We observe a
striking similarity between the plots for minimum node degree
and k-connectivity. Although not shown here for brevity, the
same phenomenon is observed in all experiments with different
parameter settings for µ and k. This provides strong evidence
in favour of minimum node degree being at least k and
k-connectivity being asymptotically equivalent properties in
inhomogeneous random K-out graphs.
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Fig. 3: Empirical probability (computed by averaging 1000 indepen-
dent experiments for each data point) of k-connectivity and minimum
node degree being no less than k as a function of Kn for n = 500,
µ = 0.5 and k = 2, 3, 4.
IV. SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we provide a brief outline for the proof of
Theorem 1; all details can be found in the Appendix. Our
proof employs the method of first and second moments [21]
applied to count variables representing the number of nodes in
H(n;µ,Kn) with degree less than k. With any d = 0, 1, . . ., let
Zn,d denote the number of nodes in H(n;µ,Kn) with degree
d. In other words, we let Zn,d =
∑n
i=1 1{deg(vi) = d},
where deg(vi) is the degree of node vi. To provide an
intuitive explanation for the dichotomy arising in Theorem 1
(depending on the limiting value of the sequence γn), we
present the next result on the mean value of Zn,d under
an additional technical condition on γn; as can be seen in
the detailed proof of Theorem 1 given in the Appendix, this
condition is not needed for our result to hold.
Lemma 1: With γn defined through (2), let |γn| = o(log n).
Then, the expected number of nodes with degree d satisfies
E [Zn,d] = Θ(1) exp {−(k − 1− d) log log n− γn} .
In order to see how the zero-one law arises in Theorem 1,
substitute d = k − 1 in Lemma 1. We see that E[Zn,k−1] =
Θ(e−γn) so that it approaches 0 (respectively, ∞) as γn tends
to ∞ (respectively, −∞). This dichotomy forms the basis
of defining γn in the critical scaling condition (2), and the
accompanying zero-one law given in Theorem 1.
To establish the one-law, we use the Markov inequality
applied to the integer-valued random variable Zn,d leading
to P[Zn,d ≤ 1] ≤ E[Zn,d]. This gives
P[Zn,d = 0] = 1− P[Zn,d ≤ 1] ≥ 1− E[Zn,d]. (5)
From Lemma 1, when γn →∞, we see that E[Zn,d]→ 0 for
all d = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Using this in (5), we get
lim
n→∞P[Zn,d = 0] = 1, d = 0, 1, . . . k − 1
which is equivalent to the one-law
lim
n→∞P [Min. node degree of H(n;µ,Kn) is ≥ k] = 1.
In order to obtain a zero-law, we invoke the method of
second moments. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality it can
be shown [21] that
P[Zn,d 6= 0] ≥ (E[Zn,d])
2
E[Z2n,d]
. (6)
From exchangeability of the indicator random variables
1{deg(vi) = d}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have
E[Z2n,d]
(E[Zn,d])2
=
1
E[Zn,d]
+
n− 1
n
P[deg(v1)= deg(v2) = d]
(P[deg(v1) = d])2
. (7)
In view of (6)-(7), we get P[Zn,d 6= 0]→ 1 if the following
two results are established.
1) lim
n→∞E[Zn,d] =∞,
2) lim sup
n→∞
P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = d]
(P[deg(v1) = d])2
≤ 1.
The zero-law in Theorem 1 follows upon establishing that
both conditions hold with d = k − 1 when γn → −∞. The
first condition follows from Lemma 1 when γn → −∞ and
d = k − 1. The proof of the second condition is involved
due to the degrees of v1, v2 being correlated in several ways.
First, if v1 picks v2 or vice versa, the degrees of both nodes are
affected. Second, if one of the remaining n−2 nodes is known
to pick v1, the chances of v2 being picked by the same node
decreases; the exact correlations will also depend on the type
of that third node. These complex correlations among node
degrees makes it necessary to consider several realizations of
the graph which result in a particular degree for v1, v2. We
direct readers to the Appendix for a complete proof of this
result and other details of Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we initiate the analysis of k-connectivity in
WSNs secured by the heterogeneous pairwise key predistri-
bution scheme; k-connectivity makes the network resilient to
failure of up to k−1 nodes or links. Our main result provides
critical conditions on the network and scheme parameters
such that with high probability every sensor has at least k
other sensors that it can securely communicate with (when the
number of nodes gets large). Through numerical simulations,
this result is shown to be useful in selecting scheme parameters
in the finite node regime. An interesting finding is that for in-
homogeneous random K-out graphs, which are induced under
the heterogeneous pairwise scheme, the number of additional
edges needed to go from 1-connectivity to k-connectivity with
k ≥ 2 is much larger than that seen in most other random
graph models studied before; see Table I for details.
This paper completes a necessary crucial step towards es-
tablishing the k-connectivity under the heterogeneous pairwise
scheme. In fact, our numerical results suggest that an analog
of our main result with the same critical scaling applies also
for k-connectivity of the network. An immediate direction for
future work is to prove this conjecture on k-connectivity. It
would also be interesting to extend our analysis to a more gen-
eralized heterogeneous pairwise key predistribution scheme
with r > 2 node types and arbitrary scheme parameters
K1,K2, . . . ,Kr associated with each node type.
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Appendix
In this Section, we present a detailed proof of Theorem 1. We remind the readers that H(n;µ,Kn) is the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph induced by the heterogeneous pairwise key predistribution scheme. Recall that for each i ∈ N , Γn,i ⊆ N−i
denotes the subset of nodes selected by node i. In order to make the dependence of Γn,i on the model parameters more explicit
we instead use the notation Γn,i(µ,Kn). In this section, we first present some preliminary results and provide a road-map for
the proof of Theorem 1.
A. PRELIMINARIES
A. Mean node degree in H(n;µ,Kn)
Let 〈Kn〉 denote the mean number of edges that each node chooses to draw. Conditioning on the class of node i, we get
〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn. (A.1)
The probability that node i picks node j where i, j ∈ N depends on the type of node i and is given by
P[j ∈ Γn,i(µ,Kn)] = µ 1
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1 =
〈Kn〉
n− 1 . (A.2)
Recall that each node draws edges to other nodes independently of other nodes. Let i ∼ j denote the event that node i can
securely communicate with node j. For i ∼ j to occur, either node i selects node j or node i selects node j or both select
each other. This gives
P[i ∼ j] = 1− (1− P[i ∈ Γn,j(µ,Kn)])(1− P[j ∈ Γn,i(µ,Kn)]),
= 1−
(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
,
=
2〈Kn〉
n− 1 −
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
. (A.3)
Consequently, the mean degree of node i can be computed as follows.
E
 ∑
j∈N−i
1{i ∼ j}
 = (n− 1)P[i ∼ j],
= 2〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉
2
n− 1 . (A.4)
An immediate consequence of (A.4) is that if the mean number of edges drawn by a node 〈Kn〉 scales as o(n), then the
resulting mean node degree is 2〈Kn〉(1− o(1)).
B. Road-map for proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 hinges on the method of moments [21] applied to count variables representing the number of nodes
in H(n;µ,Kn) with degree less than k. We separately enumerate the steps leading to the one-law and zero-law in Theorem 1.
1) Establishing the one-law in Theorem 1: Let Zd(n;µ,Kn) denote the number of nodes in H(n;µ,Kn) with degree d
where d = 1, . . . , k − 1. In other words, we let Zd(n;µ,Kn) =
∑n
i=1 1{deg(vi) = d}, where deg(vi) is the degree of node
vi. Since each node makes at least one selection, no node can have degree zero. To establish the one-law, we use the method
of first moment in which Markov inequality is applied to the integer-valued random variable Zd(n;µ,Kn) yielding
P[Zd(n;µ,Kn) ≤ 1] ≤ E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] . (A.5)
This gives
P [Zd(n;µ,Kn) = 0] = 1− P [Zd(n;µ,Kn) ≤ 1] ,
≥ 1− E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] . (A.6)
Thus, if we establish that E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)]→ 0 for all d = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 when γn →∞, then we can obtain
lim
n→∞P[Zd(n;µ,Kn) = 0] = 1, d = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. (A.7)
This in turn gives
lim
n→∞P [Min. node degree of H(n;µ,Kn) is ≥ k] = 1.
Therefore, in order to establish the one-law in Theorem 1, it suffices to show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition A.3 (Establishing one-law in Theorem 1): Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1 with 〈Kn〉 =
µ+ (1− µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence γn defined through
〈Kn〉 = log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn, for all n = 2, 3, . . . .
If γn →∞, then the expected number of nodes in H(n;µ,Kn) with degree d where d = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 approaches 0, i.e.,
lim
n→∞E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] = 0 if γn →∞.
2) Establishing the zero-law in Theorem 1: We saw above how the one-law can be proved as a consequence of the Markov
inequality applied to an integer-valued random variable counting the number of nodes with degree less than k. This technique
is referred to as the method of first moment. Next, we describe an outline for the proof of zero-law using the method of second
moment. We denote the number of type-1 nodes with degree k − 1 by Xk−1(n;µ,Kn); i.e.,
Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) :=
n∑
l=1
1{deg(vi) = k − 1, ti = 1},
Following the method of second moment, we obtain a lower bound on P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0] as follows.
(E[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2 = (E [1{Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0}Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2 ,
≤ E
[
(1{Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0})2
]
E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
]
, (A.8)
= E [1{Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0}]E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
]
,
= P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0]E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
]
,
where (A.8) is a consequence of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Thus, if E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
]
6= 0 then we have
P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0] ≥ (E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])
2
E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
] . (A.9)
From (A.9), note that if we can show that
lim inf
n→∞
(E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2
E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
] ≥ 1, (A.10)
then we get that lim
n→∞P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0] = 1 or equivalently limn→∞P[∃v ∈ N : deg(v) = k − 1, tv = 1] = 1. We then get
the zero law by noting that P[∃v ∈ N : deg(v) ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}] ≥ P[∃v ∈ N : deg(v) = k − 1, tv = 1].
From exchangeability of indicator random variables 1{deg(vi) = k − 1, ti = 1}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have
E
[
(Xk−1(n;µ,Kn))
2
]
= E
( n∑
i=1
1{deg(vi) = k − 1, ti = 1}
)2 ,
= nE
[
(1{deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1})2
]
+ n(n− 1)E [1{deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1}1{deg(v2) = k − 1, t2 = 1}] , (A.11)
= nP [deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1]
+ n(n− 1)P [deg(v1) = k − 1,deg(v2) = k − 1, t1 = 1, t2 = 1] . (A.12)
Furthermore, the exchangeability of the indicator random variables 1{deg(vi) = d} also gives
E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] = nP [deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1] . (A.13)
Combining (A.12) and (A.13), we get
E[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)2]
(E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2
=
1
E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)]
+
n− 1
n
P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = d, t1 = t2 = 1]
(P [deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1])2
. (A.14)
In view of (A.9)–(A.14), we get P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0]→ 1 if the following two propositions are established.
Proposition A.4 (Establishing zero-law in Theorem 1: First moment result): Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1
with 〈Kn〉 = µ + (1 − µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence γn defined through (2). If γn → −∞, then the expected
number of type-1 nodes in H(n;µ,Kn) with degree k − 1 approaches∞, i.e.,
lim
n→∞E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] =∞ if γn → −∞.
Proposition A.5 (Establishing zero-law in Theorem 1: Second moment result): Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1
with 〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence γn defined through (2). If γn → −∞, then
lim sup
n→∞
P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1, t1 = t2 = 1]
(P [deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1])2
≤ 1.
Next, using Proposition A.4 and Proposition A.5 in (A.14) we get that if γn → −∞ then
lim sup
n→∞
E[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)2]
(E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2
≤ 1.
which in turn yields (A.10). Combining the fact that the ratio
(E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2
E[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)2]
≤ 1 with (A.10) we get
lim
n→∞
(E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)])2
E[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)2]
= 1. (A.15)
Plugging (A.15) into (A.9) we get that P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0] = 1. Finally, noting that P[∃v ∈ N : deg(v) ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}] ≥
P[Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) 6= 0], we get the zero law in Theorem 1.
C. Useful decompositions
We enumerate some mathematical statements used in our proof.
1. For any x ∈ [0, 1), it can be verified that
log(1− x) = −
∫ x
0
1
1− tdt = −x−Ψ(x), (A.16)
where
Ψ(x) :=
∫ x
0
t
1− tdt, 0 ≤ x < 1.
Noting that Ψ(x) is non-negative, (A.16) gives the bound that for x ∈ [0, 1), we have
1− x ≤ e−x. (A.17)
Furthermore, using L’Hospital’s rule we get
lim
x→0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
1
2
. (A.18)
2. If x and y are functions of n such that x = o(1) and x2y = o(1), then
(1− x)y = e−xy(1 + o(1)). (A.19)
For a proof of this, see [25, Fact 3].
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION A.3 (ESTABLISHING ONE-LAW IN THEOREM 1)
Here, we consider the case where lim
n→∞γn = +∞. Recall that Zd(n;µ,Kn) denotes the number of nodes with degree d
where d ∈ {1, 2..., k − 1}. We have
E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] = E
[
n∑
i=1
1{deg(vi) = d}
]
,
= nE[1{deg(v1) = d}],
= nP[deg(v1) = d],
= n(µP[deg(v1) = d | t1 = 1] + (1− µ)P[deg(v1) = d | t1 = 2]), (B.20)
Note that if lim
n→∞γn = +∞, from the scaling condition (2) in Theorem 1, it is evident that limn→∞〈Kn〉 = +∞ and thus∀k ∈ N0, ∃n0 such that ∀n > n0, 〈Kn〉 > k. Consequently, for sufficiently large n, a type-2 node can never have degree less
than k for any finite value of k and thus the second term in (B.20) vanishes. Thus
E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] = nµP[deg(v1) = d | t1 = 1] + 0,
= nµ
(
n− 2
d− 1
)( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)d−1(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−1−d
, (B.21)
= nµ
(n− 2) . . . ((n− 2)− (d− 2))
(d− 1)!
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)d−1(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−1−d
,
=
µ
(d− 1)! · n ·
(n− 2)
n− 1 . . .
((n− 2)− (d− 2))
n− 1 〈Kn〉
d−1
(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−1−d
,
=
µ
(d− 1)! · n ·
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
. . .
(
1− d− 1
n− 1
)
〈Kn〉d−1
(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−1−d
, (B.22)
≤ µ
(d− 1)! · n ·
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
. . .
(
1− d− 1
n− 1
)
〈Kn〉d−1 exp
(
−〈Kn〉(n− 1− d)
n− 1
)
, (B.23)
=
µ
(d− 1)! · n ·
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
. . .
(
1− d− 1
n− 1
)
〈Kn〉d−1 exp
(
−〈Kn〉
(
1− d
n− 1
))
,
=
µ
(d− 1)!
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
. . .
(
1− d− 1
n− 1
)
exp
(
log n+ (d− 1) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉
(
1− d
n− 1
))
. (B.24)
Here, (B.23) follows from the inequality 1 − x ≤ exp(−x) ∀x ∈ [0, 1); see (A.17). Next, we simplify the argument of the
exponent in the right hand side of (B.24). We do so by substituting 〈Kn〉 in terms of γn using (2) and obtain
log n+ (d− 1) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉
(
1− d
n− 1
)
= log n+ (d− 1) log(log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn)− (log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn)
(
1− d
n− 1
)
,
= log n+ (d− 1) log
(
log n
(
1 +
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
γn
log n
))
− (log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn)
(
1− d
n− 1
)
,
= log n+ (d− 1) log log n+ (d− 1) log
(
1 +
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
γn
log n
)
− (log n+ (k − 2) log log n+ γn)
(
1− d
n− 1
)
,
= −(k − 1− d) log log n+ (d− 1) log
(
1 +
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
γn
log n
)
− γn
(
1− d
n− 1
)
+ d
log n
n− 1 + d(k − 2)
log log n
n− 1 ,
= −(k − 1− d) log log n+ (d− 1) log
(
1 + o(1) +
γn
log n
)
− γn (1− o(1)) + o(1). (B.25)
Observe that for n sufficiently large, 1 + o(1) +
γn
log n
≤ γn since γn →∞. Combining this with (B.25) gives
log n+ (d− 1) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉
(
1− d
n− 1
)
≤ −(k − 1− d) log log n+ (d− 1) log γn − γn(1− o(1)) + o(1),
= −(k − 1− d) log log n− γn(1− o(1)) + o(1). (B.26)
Combining (B.24) and (B.26) we get
E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] ≤ µ
(d− 1)! (1 + o(1)) exp
(
log n+ (d− 1) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉
(
1− d
n− 1
))
,
≤ µ
(d− 1)! (1 + o(1)) exp (−(k − 1− d) log log n− γn(1− o(1)) + o(1)). (B.27)
Recall that Zd(n;µ,Kn) is a non-negative random variable. Thus, from (B.27) we see that when γn → ∞, we have
lim
n→∞E [Zd(n;µ,Kn)] = 0 for each d = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. This completes the proof of Proposition A.3.
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION A.4: (ESTABLISHING FIRST MOMENT RESULT FOR ZERO-LAW IN THEOREM 1)
Recall that Xk−1(n;µ,Kn) denotes the number of type-1 nodes with degree k − 1. In the succeeding arguments we show
that if the sequence γn → −∞, then E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)]→ +∞. From the exchangeability of and further conditioning on the
event that the node is of type-1, we get
E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] = E
[
n∑
l=1
1{deg(vi) = k − 1, ti = 1}
]
, (C.28)
= nP[deg(v1) = k − 1, t1 = 1],
= nP[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1]P[t1 = 1],
= nµ
(
n− 2
k − 2
)( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)k−2(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−k
. (C.29)
Next, we inspect the term
(
1− 〈Kn〉n−1
)n−k
in Equation (C.29). From scaling condition (2), it is evident that
〈Kn〉 = O(log n) if lim
n→∞γn = −∞. (C.30)
Using the decomposition given in (A.16) with x = 〈Kn〉n−1 we get(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−k
= exp
(
− 〈Kn〉
n− 1 −Ψ
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
))n−k
,
= exp
(
−
(
n− k
n− 1
)
〈Kn〉 − (n− k)Ψ
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
))
,
= exp
(
−
(
1− k − 1
n− 1
)
〈Kn〉 − (n− k)Ψ
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
))
,
= exp
−〈Kn〉+ (k − 1) 〈Kn〉n− 1 − (n− k) ·
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
·
Ψ
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
 ,
= exp (−〈Kn〉) exp
(
(k − 1) 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)
exp
n− kn− 1 · 〈Kn〉2n− 1 ·
Ψ
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
 . (C.31)
Using (C.30) and (A.18) in (C.31) we get that(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−k
= exp (−〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)). (C.32)
Observe that (C.29) is analogous to (B.21) evaluated at d = k− 1. As done previously in C, combining (C.32) and (C.29), we
get
E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] = (1 + o(1))
µ
(k − 2)! exp(log n+ (k − 2) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉), (C.33)
= (1 + o(1))
µ
(k − 2)! exp
(
(k − 2) log
(
1 +
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
γn
log n
)
− γn
)
. (C.34)
Here, (C.34) follows upon using the scaling condition (2). Next, we showed that lim
n→∞E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] = +∞. Note that
for any n ∈ N0, exactly one of the following statements is true.
(i) γn ≤ − log n
2
,
(ii) γn > − log n
2
.
Case (i) For this case, γn ≤ − log n
2
and thus 〈Kn〉 ≤ log n
2
+(k−2) log log n. Also, note that 〈Kn〉−1 = (1−µ)(Kn−1) > 0
and thus log〈Kn〉 > 0. Using (C.33) this yields
exp(log n+ (k − 2) log〈Kn〉 − 〈Kn〉) ≥ exp(log n− 〈Kn〉), (C.35)
≥ exp(log n− log n
2
− (k − 2) log log n),
= exp
(
log n
2
− (k − 2) log log n
)
. (C.36)
Case (ii) For this case, γn > − log n
2
and thus
γn
log n
>
−1
2
. We can now lower bound E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] using (C.34) in
the following manner.
exp
(
log
(
1 +
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
γn
log n
)
− γn
)
> exp
(
(k − 2) log
(
(k − 2) log log n
log n
+
1
2
)
− γn
)
,
≥ exp
(
(k − 2) log
(
1
2
)
− γn
)
,
=
(
1
2
)k−2
exp (−γn) . (C.37)
From (C.33), (C.34), (C.37) and (C.36), it follows that for all n,
E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] ≥ (1 + o(1)) µ
(k − 2)! min
{(
1
2
)k−2
exp (−γn) , exp
(
log n
2
− (k − 2) log log n
)}
, (C.38)
From (C.38) we see that when lim
n→∞γn = −∞, we have that limn→∞E [Xk−1(n;µ,Kn)] = +∞.
D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION A.5: (ESTABLISHING SECOND MOMENT RESULT FOR ZERO-LAW IN THEOREM 1)
Now that we have proved Proposition A.4, in order to establish the zero law we need to prove Proposition A.5 which states
that if γn → −∞ then
lim sup
n→∞
P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1 | t1 = t2 = 1]
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
≤ 1. (D.39)
Recall that 〈Kn〉/n − 1 is the probability with which a node under consideration is connected with node v1. Moreover,
every type-1 node has at least degree 1 corresponding to the selection it makes. Therefore, in order to have degree of k − 1,
a type-1 node needs to be picked by k − 2 nodes other than itself and the node selected by node v1. Thus, we get
P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1] =
(
n− 2
k − 2
)( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)k−2(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−k
. (D.40)
Next, we compute the P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1 | t1 = t2 = 1]. Let E denote the event that deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1
where k ≥ 2. Let i → j denote the event that node vi picks node vj and let i 6→ j denote its compliment, i.e., the event
that node vi does not pick node vj . Further, conditioning on the edges drawn by node v1 and node v2, we get different cases
as illustrated in Figure 4. Here, the weight given for a branch A → B denotes the conditional probability of occurrence of
configuration B given configuration A. For example, the event that neither node v1 nor node v2 picks the other occurs with
probability given that both v1 and v2 are of type-1 occurs with probability
(
1− 1n−1
)2
. Further, given the event that neither
node v1 picks node v2 nor node v2 picks node v1 denoted by 1 6→ 2, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1, the probability that node v1 and
node v2 pick the same node is 1n−2 .
Next, depending on whether v1 and v2 select each other, P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k− 1|t1 = t2 = 1] can be decomposed as
follows.
P[E|t1 = t2 = 1]
= P[E | 1→ 2, 2→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1]P[1→ 2, 2→ 1 | t1 = t2 = 1]
+ P[E | 1→ 2, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1]P[1→ 2, 2 6→ 1 | t1 = t2 = 1]
+ P[E | 2→ 1, 1 6→ 2, t1 = t2 = 1]P[2→ 1, 1 6→ 2 | t1 = t2 = 1]
+ P[E | 1 6→ 2, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1]P[1 6→ 2, 2 6→ 1 | t1 = t2 = 1]
= P[E | 1→ 2, 2→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1] 1
(n− 1)2 + 2P[E | 1→ 2, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1]
1
n− 1
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
+ P[E | 1 6→ 2, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1]
(
1− 1
n− 1
)2
, (D.41)
where the last step follows from the symmetrical nature of events P[E | 2 → 1, 1 6→ 2, t1 = t2 = 1] and P[E | 1 → 2, 2 6→
1, t1 = t2 = 1]. Depending on the selections made by nodes v1 and v2, there can be multiple realizations which result in a
degree of k − 1 for both nodes v1 and v2. Figure 4 enumerates all such realizations and their corresponding probabilities of
occurrence. Corresponding to each realization, we mark the tuple (α,m, β), in which α (respectively, β) denotes the number
of additional edges needed to be drawn from m nodes in order to get the resulting degree of k − 1 for node v1 (respectively,
node v2).
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Fig. 4: Configurations for which nodes v1 and v2 achieve the desired node degree of k − 1 given that both these nodes are type-1. The weight
given for a branchA→ B gives the conditional probability of arriving at the next configurationB from the current configurationA. In the tuple
(α,m, β), α (respectively, β) denotes the number of additional edges needed to be drawn from m nodes to obtain a degree of k− 1 for node v1
(respectively, node v2). There are a total of 10 distinct realizations which result in the node degrees of nodes v1 and v2 being k − 1 given that
they are type-1 nodes. In the figure we only include one of the symmetric cases P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1 | 2 → 1, 1 6→ 2, t1 = t2 = 1]
and P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1 | 1→ 1, 2 6→ 1, t1 = t2 = 1].
Let Bn−cα,β denote the probability that out of a total of n− c nodes, α nodes draw an edge to node v1 and β nodes draw an
outgoing edge to node v2. To evaluate Bn−cα,β , we need to consider different cases bases on the selections made by v1 and v2.
⍺-r r β-r
n-c
v2v1
Fig. 5: From a pool of n− c nodes, α− r nodes draw an edge to node v1 but not node v2, β − r nodes draw an outgoing edge to node v2 but
not node v1, r nodes draw an outgoing edge to both node v1 and node v2 and the remaining n− c− α− β + r nodes draw an edge to neither
node v1 nor node v2.
Recall that our goal is to show that
lim sup
n→∞
P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k − 1|t1 = t2 = 1]
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
≤ 1. (D.42)
We can write P[E|t1 = t2 = 1] by summing over different configurations shown in Figure 4 as follows.
P[E|t1 = t2 = 1] = 1
(n− 1)2B
n−2
k−2,k−2 +
2
n− 1
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
Bn−3k−3,k−3 +
2
n− 1
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
Bn−3k−2,k−3
+
(
1− 1
n− 1
)2
1
n− 2B
n−3
k−2,k−2 +
(
1− 1
n− 1
)2(
1− 1
n− 2
)( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
Bn−4k−3,k−3
+
(
1− 1
n− 1
)2(
1− 1
n− 2
)
· 2 · 〈Kn〉
n− 1
(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)
Bn−4k−2,k−3
+
(
1− 1
n− 1
)2(
1− 1
n− 2
)(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
Bn−4k−2,k−2. (D.43)
In order to establish Proposition A.5, we postulate the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1 with 〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence
γn defined through (2). If γn → −∞, then
Bn−cα,β
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
=
((k − 2)!)2
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β+4−2k(1 + o(1)).
Table II enumerates the limit that
Bn−cα,β
P2[deg(v1)=k−1 | t1=1] approaches as n → ∞ for different pairs of α and β arising in our
analysis (Figure 4). From Figure 4 and Table II, it can be seen that as n → ∞ the only non-zero term appearing in (D.43)
TABLE II: Evaluation of the expression in Lemma 2 for different (α, β) arising in Figure 4
α β
Bn−cα,β
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
k − 3 k − 3 (k − 2)
2
〈Kn〉2
(1 + o(1))
k − 3 k − 2 k − 2〈Kn〉
(1 + o(1))
k − 2 k − 3 k − 2〈Kn〉
(1 + o(1))
k − 2 k − 2 1 + o(1)
corresponds to the case when neither node v1 nor v2 pick each other and v1 and v2 nodes select distinct nodes. Further,
the node that is selected by v1 (respectively, v2) does not select v2 (respectively, v1). As n → ∞, this configuration has a
probability of 1 and is the dominant term in (D.43). Moreover, from Figure 4 note that for this case α = β = k− 2 and using
Lemma 2, we have lim
n→∞
Bn−cα,β
(P[deg(v1)=k−1 | t1=1])2 = 1 (Table II). Therefore, limn→∞
P[deg(v1)=deg(v2)=k−1|t1=t2=1]
(P[deg(v1)=k−1 | t1=1])2 = 1 and thus
lim sup
n→∞
P[deg(v1)=deg(v2)=k−1|t1=t2=1]
(P[deg(v1)=k−1 | t1=1])2 = 1. Thus, Proposition A.5 holds as a consequence of Lemma 2.
E. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We proceed to prove Lemma 2 which states that if γn → −∞, then we have
Bn−cα,β
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
=
((k − 2)!)2
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β+4−2k(1 + o(1)).
Recall that Bn−cα,β denotes the probability that out of a pool of n−c nodes, α nodes draw an edge to node v1 and β nodes draw
an outgoing edge to node v2. Here, note that it is possible that some type-2 nodes draw edges to both nodes v1 and v2. In order
to compute Bn−cα,β , we introduce A
n−c
α−r,r,β−r as the probability that out of a total of n− c nodes, α− r nodes draw an edge to
node v1 but not node v2, β − r nodes draw an outgoing edge to node v2 but not node v1, r nodes draw an outgoing edge to
both node v1 and the remaining nodes draw an edge to neither (Figure 5). If node v1 (respectively, v2) needs (α, respectively β)
additional edges from the remaining n−c to achieve a degree of k−1, then P[deg(v1) = deg(v2) = k−1 | t1 = t2 = 1] = Bn−cα,β .
We can express Bn−cα,β in terms of A
n−c
α−r,r,β−r where 0 ≤ r ≤ min{α, β} as follows.
Bn−cα,β =
min{α,β}∑
r=0
An−cα−r,r,β−r.
In order to explicitly compute, An−cα−r,r,β−r we denote
p12 := P[vx → v1, vx → v2],
p1¯2 := P[vx 6→ v1, vx → v2],
p12¯ := P[vx → v1, vx 6→ v2],
p1¯2¯ := P[vx 6→ v1, vx 6→ v2],
where node vx is a node from a pool of n− c nodes (Figure 4). Observe that
An−cα−r,r,β−r =
(
n− c
α− r
)(
n− c− α+ r
r
)(
n− c− α
β − r
)
(p12¯)
α−r(p12)r(p1¯2)
β−r(p1¯2¯)
n−c−α−β+r,
=
(n− c)!
(α− r)!r!(β − r)!(n− c− (α+ β) + r)! (p12¯)
α+β−2r(p12)r(p1¯2¯)
n−c−(α+β)+r. (E.44)
In order to prove Lemma 2, we need the following intermediate results which show that An−cα−r,r,β−r is a monotone decreasing
sequence in r with An−cα−(r+1),r+1,β−(r+1) = o(1)A
n−c
α−r,r,β−r for all r = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,min{α, β}. Next, we compute the dominant
term corresponding to r = 0 in the finite sum Bn−cα,β =
∑min{α,β}
r=0
Lemma 3: Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1 with 〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence
γn defined through (2). If γn → −∞, then
An−cα−(r+1),(r+1),β−(r+1)
An−cα−r,r,β−r
= o(1) for all r = 0, 1, . . . ,min{α, β}.
Lemma 4: Consider a scaling Kn : N0 → N0, 0 < µ < 1 with 〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn, a positive integer k ≥ 2 and sequence
γn defined through (2). If γn → −∞, then
An−cα,0,β =
1
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β exp(−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)).
Recall that we can express Bn−cα,β in terms of A
n−c
α−r,r,β−r as follows.
Bn−cα,β =
min{α,β}∑
r=0
An−cα−r,r,β−r. (E.45)
Using Lemma 3 in (E.45), we get
Bn−cα,β = A
n−c
α,0,β
(
1 + o(1) + (o(1))2 + · · ·+ (o(1))min{α,β}
)
.
= An−cα,0,β (1 + o(1)) , (E.46)
where (E.46) follows from noting that α, β are finite constants and thus (E.45) corresponds to a finite sum. Using Lemma 4
in (E.46), we get
Bn−cα,β =
1
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β exp(−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)). (E.47)
Observe that
P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1] =
(
n− 2
k − 2
)( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)k−2(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)n−k
.
Arguing as before and using (C.32), we get
P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1] = 1
(k − 2)! 〈Kn〉
k−2 exp (−〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)). (E.48)
Combining (E.48) and (E.47), we get the desired result,
Bn−cα,β
(P[deg(v1) = k − 1 | t1 = 1])2
=
(k − 2)!2
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β+4−2k(1 + o(1)).
The proof of Lemma 2 is now complete.
E.I. Proof of Lemma 3
Next, we prove Lemma 3 which states that if γn → −∞, then
An−cα−(r+1),(r+1),β−(r+1)
An−cα−r,r,β−r
= o(1).
From (E.44), observe that
An−cα−(r+1),(r+1),β−(r+1)
An−cα−r,r,β−r
=
(α− r)(β − r)
(r + 1)(n− c− (α+ β) + r) ·
p12p1¯2¯
(p12¯)2
. (E.49)
Next, we compute lim
n→∞
p12p1¯2¯
(p12¯)
2 . We ascertain the probablities p12, p1¯2, p12¯ and p1¯2¯. Observe that a type-1 node can only select
one amongst nodes v1 or v2. Thus, both nodes v1 and v2 can be selected by only type-2 nodes. This gives
p12 = µ.0 + (1− µ)
(
n−3
Kn−2
)(
n−1
Kn
) ,
= (1− µ) (Kn)(Kn − 1)
(n− 1)(n− 2) . (E.50)
Similarly, we can obtain the probability that exactly one amongst v1 or v2 is picked and the probability that neither v1 nor v2
is picked by a third node. Moreover from symmetry, p1¯2 = p12¯. We have
p1¯2 = p12¯ = µ
1
n− 1 + (1− µ)
(
n−3
Kn−1
)(
n−1
Kn
)
= µ
1
n− 1 + (1− µ)
(n−Kn − 1)(Kn)
(n− 1)(n− 2) ,
= µ
1
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1 − (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1
Kn − 1
n− 2 ,
=
〈Kn〉
n− 1
(
1− (1− µ) Kn〈Kn〉
Kn − 1
n− 2
)
,
=
〈Kn〉
n− 1(1 + o(1)) (E.51)
where the last step follows from noting that 1 ≤ 〈Kn〉 ≤ Kn and 〈Kn〉 = O(log n). Next, we simplify p1¯2¯ as follows.
p1¯2¯ = µ
n− 3
n− 1 + (1− µ)
(
n−3
Kn
)(
n−1
Kn
) ,
= µ
n− 3
n− 1 + (1− µ)
(n−Kn − 1)(n−Kn − 2)
(n− 1)(n− 2) ,
= µ(1− 2
n− 1) + (1− µ)(1−
Kn
n− 1)(1−
Kn
n− 2),
= 1−
(
2µ
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 2
)
+ (1− µ) Kn
n− 1
Kn
n− 2 ,
= 1−
(
2µ
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1
(
1 +
1
n− 2
))
+ (1− µ) Kn
n− 1
Kn
n− 2 ,
= 1− 2
(
µ+ (1− µ)Kn
n− 1
)
+ (1− µ) Kn
n− 1
Kn − 1
n− 2 ,
= 1−
(
2〈Kn〉
n− 1 − (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1
Kn − 1
n− 2
)
. (E.52)
When γn → −∞ then 〈Kn〉 scales as O(log n) and an implication of (E.52) is that
p1¯2¯ = 1 + o(1). (E.53)
Using (E.50), (E.51) and (E.53),
(p12¯)
2
p1¯2¯p12
=
〈Kn〉2
(n− 1)2 (1 + o(1))
2
(1 + o(1))(1− µ)Kn
n
(Kn − 1)
n
,
=
〈Kn〉2(1 + o(1))2 n
2
(n− 1)2
(1 + o(1))(1− µ)Kn(Kn − 1)
=
(µ+ (1− µ),Kn)2
(1− µ)Kn(Kn − 1) ,
=
µ2
(1− µ)Kn(Kn − 1) +
(1− µ)Kn
Kn − 1 +
2µ
Kn − 1 = Θ(1).
Thus,
p1¯2¯p12
(p12¯)2
= Θ(1). (E.54)
Combining (E.49) and (E.54), we get the desired result.
An−cα−(r+1),(r+1),β−(r+1)
An−cα−r,r,β−r
= o(1). (E.55)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
E.II. Proof of Lemma 4
We need to prove Lemma 4 which states that if γn → −∞, then
An−cα,0,β =
1
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β exp(−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)).
Substituting r = 0 in (E.44), we get
An−cα,0,β =
(n− c)!
α!β!(n− c− (α+ β))! (p12¯)
α+β(p1¯2¯)
n−c−(α+β) (E.56)
Before proceeding with the proof of Lemma 4, we first show that when γn → −∞,
(p1¯2¯)
n−u = exp (−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)), (E.57)
Consider u ∈ N, 1 ≤ u < n. Using (A.19) in (E.52) with y = n − u and x = 2〈Kn〉n−1 − (1 − µ) Knn−1 Kn−1n−2 and noting that
x2y = o(1), we get
(p1¯2¯)
n−u ∼ exp
(
−2〈Kn〉
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1
Kn − 1
n− 2
)
(n− u),
= exp (−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)).
Finally, substituting p12¯ and p1¯2¯ in (E.56) using (E.51) and (E.57) combined with the fact that 〈Kn〉 = O(log n) gives
An−cα,0,β =
(n− c)!
α!β!(n− c− (α+ β))! (p12¯)
α+β(p1¯2¯)
n−(c+α+β),
=
(n− c)!
α!β!(n− c− (α+ β))!
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1(1 + o(1))
)α+β
exp (−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)),
=
1
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β exp (−2〈Kn〉)Π
α+β−1
i=0 (n− c− i)
(n− 1)α+β (1 + o(1)),
=
1
α!β!
〈Kn〉α+β exp(−2〈Kn〉)(1 + o(1)), (E.58)
which completes the proof for Lemma 4.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
If |γn| = o(log n), then using (2), we see that 〈Kn〉 = Θ(log n). Consequently, as n → ∞, type-2 nodes cannot have a
finite degree. Observe that with 〈Kn〉 = Θ(log n), (C.32) holds true. (C.32) can then be substituted in (B.22) and simplified
as done previously in (B.25) to get that the expected number of nodes with degree d satisfies
E [Zn,d] = Θ(1) exp {−(k − 1− d) log log n− γn} .
